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Abstract Higher order derivatives have been introduced by Lai in a cryptographic con-
text. A number of attacks such as differential cryptanalysis, the cube and the AIDA attack
have been reformulated using higher order derivatives. Duan and Lai have introduced the
notion of “fast points” of a polynomial function f as being vectors a so that computing the
derivative with respect to a decreases the total degree of f by more than one. This notion
is motivated by the fact that most of the attacks become more efficient if they use fast
points. Duan and Lai gave a characterisation of fast points and Duan et al. gave some results
regarding the number of functions with fast points in some particular cases. We firstly give
an alternative characterisation of fast points and secondly give an explicit formula for the
number of functions with fast points for any given degree and number of variables, thus
covering all the cases left open in Duan et al. Our main tool is an invertible linear change of
coordinates which transforms the higher order derivative with respect to an arbitrary set of
linearly independent vectors into the higher order derivative with respect to a set of vectors
in the canonical basis. Finally we discuss the cryptographic significance of our results.
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1 Introduction
Higher order derivatives were introduced in a cryptographic context by Lai in [6]. This
notion had already been used for a very long time, under the name of finite difference
(see also discrete derivative, Delta operator, difference equations etc.), in other areas of
mathematics (notably for the numerical approximation of the derivative, or as a discrete
analogue of the derivative). The discrete derivative of a function f with respect to a vector a
is the function af (x) = f (x + a) − f (x). A higher order derivative of order k is obtained
by repeated application of this operator, k times, with respect to k vectors a1, . . . , ak .
A number of cryptographic attacks can be reformulated using higher order derivatives.
Differential cryptanalysis (introduced by Biham and Shamir [1]) has been thus reformulated
by Lai in [6]; the cube attack of Dinur and Shamir [2] and the related AIDA attack of
Vielhaber [7] have been reformulated in Knellwolf and Meier [5], Duan and Lai [3]. Other
attacks are also mentioned in [3].
Most attacks mentioned above treat the cryptographic function as a “black box” boolean
function f . Computing a higher order derivative of order k will involve 2k calls to the “black
box” function f . Any boolean function can be represented in Algebraic Normal Form, i.e.
as a polynomial over F2 with degree at most one in each variable. Differentiation decreases
the total degree d of a function by at least one. The attacks rely on computing higher order
derivatives to obtain a function which has some “non-random” behaviour, ideally it is a lin-
ear function. If the degree decreases by exactly one for each differentiation, then we would
need differentiation of order k = d − 1 (i.e. 2d−1 calls to f ) to achieve a linear func-
tion. Most well designed cryptographic functions have a high degree, so 2d−1 would be
prohibitively large. However, if the degree decreases by more than one for some of the dif-
ferentiation steps, an attack can be successful for an order of differentiation k considerably
lower then d − 1.
Motivated by this, Duan and Lai [3] introduced the notion of “fast points”. Namely a is
a fast point for a polynomial function f if differentiation with respect to a decreases the
degree of f by two or more.
In [3], Duan and Lai gave characterisations of fast points. In [4], Duan et al. showed that
given a function f , its set of fast points forms a vector space. They also started to investigate
the number of polynomial functions with fast points among the polynomial function of
given degree d in n variables. They succeeded giving exact formulae for a few particular
cases (degree 1,2, n−2, n−1); for the other degrees, numerical results were given when the
number of variables is small (at most 8) by exhaustively enumerating all these functions and
checking whether they have fast points. Such an approach is very computationally intensive
(more than exponential in the degree of the polynomial) so some values are missing in their
tables for 7 and 8 variables.
We continue the work commenced in [3] and [4] using a different approach. Our main
tool is a suitably chosen linear change of variables. While we are mostly interested in results
over the binary field, when possible we will formulate results more generally, for finite fields
or for arbitrary fields. We show that differentiation with respect to an arbitrary set of vectors
can be transformed, via an invertible linear change of variables, into differentiation with
respect to a set of vectors in the canonical basis. (For an analogy, in the case of functions
in several variables over the real numbers, directional derivatives can be transformed into
partial derivatives via a suitable change of coordinates.) It is much easier to characterise and
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to count functions which admit canonical basis vectors as fast points. We then transfer these
results to functions that have arbitrary fast points.
We give thus an alternative characterisation of fast points (Corollary 2). Let f be a func-
tion in n variables and of degree d. In essence, we show that f has fast points if, when
ignoring its monomials of degree less than d, f is actually a function in less than n vari-
ables, possibly “disguised” by an invertible linear change of coordinates. For example, the
function f (x1, x2, x3) = x1x2 + x1x3 looks like a function in 3 variables, but can actually
be viewed as a function in two variables, g(y1, y2) = y1y2 followed by the change of vari-
ables y1 = x1, y2 = x2 +x3. When designing cryptographic functions, one should therefore
avoid such functions, as much as possible.
Next, in Section 5 we count the number |F(n, d)| of functions of degree d in n variables
that have fast points. We obtain a recurrence relation for |F(n, d)|, and also an explicit
formula (Theorem 6). We further refine our results to give within each degree d and number
of variables n, the number of functions whose fast points form a space of dimension k.
Numerical values can then easily be computed at minimal computational cost (the number
of integer multiplications/additions is polynomial in n). For illustration, in Section 7 we
displayed the results for up to 8 variables, thus filling in the gaps in the table of Duan
et al. [4].
The effect of a change of variables on higher order differentiation is examined in
Section 6. We propose a natural generalisation of “fast points” to “fast spaces”. Counting
functions with fast spaces is probably feasible but rather difficult and of less interest, so we
have not pursued it further.
Finally we discuss in Section 8 the cryptographic significance of our results. Using our
previous results we estimate probabilities of a function having fast points and also give
some asymptotic results. Perhaps not surprisingly, it turns out that fast points are relatively
rare. For 3 ≤ d ≤ n − 3, the proportion of functions of degree d with fast points out of the
total number of functions of degree d decreases very fast with n and is asymptotically zero.
The ratio is approximately 1
2(
n−1
d−1)−n
, so its decrease, as n increases, is faster than conjectured
in [4, Remark 12] (their conjecture was a geometric series in n). For a given number of
variables n, polynomials of degree approximately n/2 are least likely to have fast points; this
probability increases as we move towards lower or higher degrees. We also show that for a
fixed n and d (again 3 ≤ d ≤ n− 3) out of the functions that do have fast points, most have
only one fast point, then much fewer have 3 fast points, even fewer have 23 − 1 fast points
etc. One should keep in mind though that these results assume that the function is picked
uniformly at random. In practice, cryptographic functions have additional constraints, and
an attacker should exploit such information to improve their chances of finding fast points.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout this paper K will denote an arbitrary field and Fp denotes the finite field with
p elements where p is a prime. We denote by ei = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Kn the vector
which has a 1 in position i and zeroes elsewhere, i.e. e1, . . . , en is the canonical basis of the
vector space Kn. We will denote by 〈a1, . . . , an〉 the vector subspace of Kn generated by
a1, . . . , an ∈ Kn. The all-zero vector will be denoted by 0.
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We recall the definition of (discrete) derivative/ differentiation here:
Definition 1 Let f : Kn → K be a function in n variables x1, . . . , xn. Let a =
(a1, . . . , an) ∈ Kn \ {0}. The differentiation operator with respect to a vector a associates
to each function f its discrete derivative af defined as
af (x1, . . . , xn) = f (x1 + a1, . . . , xn + an) − f (x1, . . . , xn).
Denoting x = (x1, . . . , xn) we can also write af (x) = f (x + a) − f (x).
For the particular case of a = ei for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we will call ei differentiation (or
discrete derivative) w.r.t. the variable xi .
Remark 1 Note that the discrete derivative with respect to a variable x should not be con-
fused with the formal derivative with respect to x. The two notions coincide for polynomials
of degree at most one in x, but they are different for higher degrees. For example, for the
function f : F5 → F5, f (x) = x3, the discrete derivative is 3x2 + 3x + 1 whereas the for-
mal derivative is 3x2. Functions over F2 can always be represented as polynomial functions
of degree at most one in each variable, so in this case the two notions coincide.
The differentiation operator is a linear operator. Repeated application of this operator
(which is commutative and associative) is called higher order differentiation and the result
of applying it to a function will be called higher order derivative. It will be denoted by
(k)a1,...,ak f = a1a2 . . . ak f
where a1, . . . , ak ∈ Kn are not necessarily distinct.
The change of variables is a widely used technique in different areas of mathematics.
Here we are only interested in invertible linear changes of variables (which can also be
viewed as a linear change of coordinates, or a change of basis).
Definition 2 Let T be an invertible n×n matrix over K . We say that T defines the invertible
linear change of variables described as x = T y.
If f : Kn → K is a function in n variables x1, . . . , xn, the function obtained from
f by this change of variables is the function g(y) = f (T y). In other words, defining
ϕT : Kn → Kn as ϕ(y) = T y, the change of variable defined by T is the composition by
ϕT , i.e. f ◦ ϕT .
Note that in the definition above the change of variables is indeed invertible: the func-
tion f can also be obtained from the function g by the linear change of variable f (x) =
g(T −1x). In other words, (ϕT )−1 = ϕT −1 .
If f is a polynomial, we will denote by deg(f ) the total degree of f , with the usual
convention of deg(0) = −∞. The following is a well known result needed later:
Proposition 1 The total degree of a polynomial is preserved under invertible linear changes
of variables.
(For a quick proof, note first that the degree cannot increase after a linear change of
coordinate. If g(y) = f (T y) then deg(g) ≤ deg(f ). On the other hand, we can view f
as being obtained from g via the linear change of variables given by T −1, so by the same
argument deg(f ) ≤ deg(g).)
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Differentiation decreases the degree of a polynomial by at least one:
Proposition 2 [6] Let f : Kn → K be a polynomial function in n variables and a ∈
Kn \ {0}. Then deg(af ) ≤ deg(f ) − 1.
We will be interested in the situations where the degree decreases by more than one.
Definition 3 [3, 4] Let f : Kn → K be a non-constant polynomial function in n variables
and a ∈ Kn \ {0}. We call a a fast point for f if deg(af ) < deg(f ) − 1.
For convenience we will also consider 0 as a (trivial) fast point for any polynomial func-
tion f (since 0f = f (x + 0) − f (x) = 0, although we do not normally define the
differentiation operator for the difference 0).
It was shown in [4] that over F2 the set of fast points for a polynomial function f is a
linear space. The result actually holds over arbitrary fields:
Theorem 1 (cf. [4, Lemma 3.1] ) Let f : Kn → K be a polynomial function. The set of all
fast points of f is a linear space.
The proof is the same as in [4], namely putting a = (a1, . . . , an) and deg(f ) = d,
the coefficient of each of the monomials of degree d − 1 in af is a linear expression in
a1, . . . , an. The vector a is a fast point iff all those expressions equal zero, i.e. a1, . . . , an
is a solution of the corresponding linear system of equations. In the binary case, there are(
n
d − 1
)
terms of degree d − 1, so in general there are
(
n
d − 1
)
equations (but depending
on f , some of these equations can be degenerate 0 = 0).
Recall that all functions f : Fnp → Fp can be uniquely represented in Algebraic Normal
Form, i.e. as a polynomial function corresponding to a polynomial of degree at most p − 1
in each variable.
We will need to count the number of vector subspaces of a given vector space. We recall
the notion of Gaussian binomial coefficients (the definition can be given in a more general
form, but we only need the form below):
Definition 4 Let 0 ≤ k ≤ n and q > 1 be integers. The Gaussian binomial coefficients (or
q-binomial coefficients) are defined as
(
n
k
)
q
= (q
n − 1)(qn−1 − 1) · · · (qn−k+1 − 1)
(qk − 1)(qk−1 − 1) · · · (q − 1) .
Proposition 3 The number of vector subspaces of dimension k of the vector space Fnq is
equal to
(
n
k
)
q
.
3 Change of variables and differentiation
We first show that differentiation with respect to a vector a can be transformed, using
a suitable change of variables, to differentiation w.r.t. a canonical basis vector ej , i.e.
differentiation w.r.t. one variable xj .
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Theorem 2 Let f be a function of n variables f : Kn → K and let T be an invertible
n × n matrix over K . Denote by g the function obtained from f via the change of variables
defined by T , namely: g(y) = f (T y). Then for any a ∈ Kn \ {0} we have:
(af )(T y) = (T −1ag)(y).
In particular, if a equals column j of T , we have:
(af )(T y) = (ej g)(y)
or equivalently
(af )(x) = (ej g)(T −1x).
Proof Applying the change of variables T to (af )(x) = f (x + a) − f (x) we obtain:
(af )(T y) = f (T y + a) − f (T y)
= f (T (y + T −1a)) − f (T y)
= g(y + T −1a) − g(y)
= (T −1ag)(y).
For the case that a equals column j of T , we have T ej = a, so T −1a = ej .
An equivalent formulation of the Theorem above is to say that the following diagram
commutes:
F(Kn,K) a−→ F(Kn,K)
T ↓ ↓ T
F(Kn,K)
ej−→ F(Kn,K)
where F(Kn,K) denotes the set of functions from Kn to K and T denotes the operator
of change of variables defined by T , i.e. T (f ) = f ◦ ϕT .
An important particular case of the theorem above is:
Corollary 1 Let a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Kn \ {0} and let j be such that aj 
= 0. For any
function of n variables f : Kn → K we have
(af )(x1, . . . , xn) =
(ej g)
(
x1 − a1
aj
xj , . . . , xj−1 − aj−1
aj
xj ,
1
aj
xj , xj+1 − aj+1
aj
xj , . . . , xn − an
aj
xj
)
where g is the function obtained from f by the change of variables g(y1, . . . , yn) = f (y1 +
a1yj , . . . , yj−1 + aj−1yj , aj yj , yj+1 + aj+1yj , . . . , yn + anyj ).
In particular, if the field is K = F2, we have
(af )(x1, . . . , xn) = (ej g)(x1+a1xj , . . . , xj−1−aj−1xj , xj , xj+1+aj+1xj , . . . , xn+anxj )
where g is the function obtained from f by the change of variables g(y1, . . . , yn) = f (y1 +
a1yj , . . . , yj−1 + aj−1yj , yj , yj+1 + aj+1yj , . . . , yn + anyj ).
Proof We apply Theorem 1 for the matrix T consisting of the identity matrix, except that
column j is replaced by column a. Note that when the field is F2 this matrix equals its
inverse.
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4 Characterisation of fast points
For differentiation w.r.t. one variable in Fp it is easy to characterise fast points:
Proposition 4 Let f be a function of n variables of degree d, f : Fnp → Fp , and let
1 ≤ j ≤ n. We have that ej is a fast point for f iff none of the monomials of f of degree d
contain xj .
The total degree of ej f is precisely one less than the highest total degree among the
monomials of f that contain xj .
Proof Let f = f1 + f2 with all terms in f1 having degree d and all terms in f2 having
degree d − 1 or less.
If xj does not appear in f1, then obviously ej f1 = 0, so deg(ej f ) = deg(ej f2) ≤
deg(f2) − 1 ≤ d − 2, i.e. ej is a fast point for f .
For the reverse implication, assume ej is a fast point for f . Without loss of generality,
assume j = 1. Assume, for a contradiction, that f1 does contain x1. Let f1 = xd11 g1 + . . .+
x
d
1 g+f3, where d1, . . . , d are distinct integers in {1, 2, . . . , p−1} (since in the Algebraic
Normal Form the degree in each variable is at most p−1), gj are polynomials in x2, . . . , xn
of total degree d−dj and f3 is a polynomial in x2, . . . , xn. Then e1xdi1 gi = dixdi−11 gi +hi
where hi has degree d −2 or less. So e1f1 = d1xd1−11 g1 + . . .+dxd−11 g +h1 + . . .+h
where h1 + . . . + h has total degree d − 2 or less. Since di ≤ p − 1 for all i, we have
di mod p 
= 0. Also, for all i 
= j none of the monomials in dixdi−11 gi can be a monomial
in djx
dj−1
1 gj (their degree in x1 is different), so they cannot cancel out. This means that
deg(e1f ) = d − 1, i.e. e1 is not a fast point for f . Contradiction.
On the other hand, Theorem 2 allows us to transform fast points using a change of
variables:
Theorem 3 Let f : Fnp → Fp and a ∈ Fnp \ {0}. Let T be an invertible matrix
and let g be obtained from f via the change of variables defined by T , i.e. g(y) =
f (T y). For any a ∈ Fnp \ {0} we have that a is a fast point for f iff T −1a is a fast
point for g.
In particular, if a equals column j of T , we have that a is a fast point for f iff ej is a fast
point for g.
Proof Let d = deg(f ). By Proposition 1, deg(g) = d. Using Theorem 2 we have
(af )(x) = (T −1ag)(T −1x). We have that a is a fast point for f iff deg(af ) < d − 1.
But the degree in x of (af )(x) equals the degree in x of (T −1ag)(T
−1x). By Proposi-
tion 1, the latter equals the degree in y of (T −1ag)(y), which is smaller than d −1 iff T −1a
is a fast point for g.
The last part, when a equals column j of T , follows from T ej = a.
Using Theorem 3, we can transfer the results of Proposition 4 to arbitrary fast points,
obtaining thus a general characterisation of fast points. This is different from the character-
isation in [3, Theorem 3].
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Corollary 2 Let f : Fnp → Fp . Then f has a fast point iff f can be obtained by an
invertible linear change of coordinates from a polynomial function g which, when restricted
to the monomials of maximum degree, only depends on n − 1 (or fewer) variables.
More precisely, for any a ∈ Fnp \ {0}, the following statements are equivalent:
(a) a is a fast point for f
(b) There is a j for which aj 
= 0 and none of the monomials of maximum total degree
(in y1, . . . , yn) of g(y1, . . . , yn) = f (y1 + a1yj , . . . , yj−1 + aj−1yj , aj yj , yj+1 +
aj+1yj , . . . , yn + anyj ) contain yj .
(c) For all j , if aj 
= 0 then none of the monomials of maximum total degree (in
y1, . . . , yn) of g(y1, . . . , yn) = f (y1 + a1yj , . . . , yj−1 + aj−1yj , aj yj , yj+1 +
aj+1yj , . . . , yn + anyj ) contain yj .
(d) There is an invertible matrix T which has one column (say column j ) equal to a and
none of the monomials of maximum degree in g(y) = f (T y) contain the variable yj .
(e) For all invertible matrices T which have one column (say column j ) equal to a, none
of the monomials of maximum degree in g(y) = f (T y) contain the variable yj .
If any of the above equivalent conditions is satisfied then the degree of
(af )(x1, . . . , xn) is precisely d1 − 1 where d1 is the highest total degree among the
monomials of g(y1, . . . , yn) that contain yj .
Example 1 Let us look at the example from [3, Section V], the boolean function
f (x1, x2, x3, x4) = x1x2x3 + x1x2x4, which has (0, 0, 1, 1) as a fast point. Although this
appears to be a function in 4 variables, writing it as f (x1, x2, x3, x4) = x1x2(x3 + x4) it is
clear that it is essentially a function in 3 variables, i.e. it can be obtained from the function
g(y1, y2, y3, y4) = y1y2y3, which actually only depends on 3 variables, using the invertible
linear change of coordinates y3 = x3 + x4 and yi = xi for i = 1, 2, 4.
Next let us look at the example from [6], used also in [4, Section 1], f (x1, x2, x3, x4) =
x1x2x3 + x1x2x4 + x2x3x4, which has fast point (1, 0, 1, 1). This looks like a func-
tion in 4 variables, and it is not immediately obvious how to write it so that the part
of degree 3 depends only on 3 variables. Using the Corollary above and the fact that
(1, 0, 1, 1) is a fast point, it turns out that it can be obtained from the polynomial func-
tion g(y1, y2, y3, y4) = y1y2y3 + y2y4 by the change of coordinates y1 = x1 + x4,
y2 = x2, y3 = x3 + x4, y4 = x4. However, if we did not know a fast point for f , find-
ing a suitable change of variable is more difficult, and involves solving a system of linear
equations, see below.
Let us consider Corollary 2 in the binary case, and without loss of generality, assume
j = 1. Determining a change of variables g(y1, . . . , yn) = f (y1, y2 +a2y1, . . . , yn +any1)
such that none of the monomials of maximum total degree (in y1, . . . , yn) of g contains y1
amounts to solving a system of equations in the n − 1 unknowns a2, . . . , an. The system is
obtained by imposing that for each of the
(
n − 1
d − 1
)
terms of degree d that contain y1, their
coefficient in g is zero. We have thus
(
n − 1
d − 1
)
equations, and one can verify that in the
binary case the equations are linear ( Idea of the proof: applying the change of variables to
a term, say x2x3 produces (y2 + a2y1)(y3 + a3y1) = y2y3 + a2y1y3 + a3y1y2 + a2a3y21 , but
the last term, whose coefficient is not linear in the ai , equals actually a2a3y1 as a function
over F2, so it is not a term of maximum degree.)
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5 Counting functions with fast points
In this section we are interested in counting the functions of degree d, in n variables over
F2 which have fast points. This study was started in [4].
To decide whether a point a is a fast point for f we only need to look at the monomi-
als of f of degree d, as only they could potentially produce monomials of degree d − 1 in
the derivative. Therefore, instead of counting the functions we will count the equivalence
classes of the following equivalence relation on the set of polynomial functions: f is equiv-
alent to g iff deg(f ) = deg(g) and deg(f −g) < deg(f ). (In other words two functions are
equivalent if when restricted to the monomials of maximum degree, they become equal.)
For the rest of this section, whenever we speak of a polynomial function we will mean its
equivalence class.
There are
(
n
d
)
terms in n variables which have total degree d and degree at most 1 in
each variable. Hence the total number of polynomial functions of degree d over F2 (in the
sense of equivalence classes, as explained above) is 2
(
n
d
)
− 1.
We saw in Theorem 1 that the fast points form a vector space. We will therefore refine
our counting results, by counting the functions that have a space of fast points of a certain
dimension.
For any integers n, d, k with 0 ≤ d ≤ n and 0 ≤ k ≤ n we will denote by F(n, d, k) the
set of polynomial functions over F2 (equivalence classes in the sense above) in n variables,
of degree d and with a space of fast points of dimension k. Since these sets form a partition
of the set of polynomial functions of degree d, we have
n∑
k=0
|F(n, d, k)| = 2
(
n
d
)
− 1. (1)
Like in [4] we denote by F(n, d) the set of polynomials of degree d in n variables that
have (any number of) non-trivial fast points. Hence:
|F(n, d)| =
n∑
k=1
|F(n, d, k)|. (2)
Using equation (1) this can be rewritten as:
|F(n, d)| = 2
(
n
d
)
− 1 − |F(n, d, 0)|. (3)
For a start we examine the set of functions that have a given set of canonical basis vectors
as fast points:
Lemma 1
(i) The set of polynomial functions over F2 in n variables x1, . . . , xn and of degree d
which have 〈en−k+1, . . . , en〉 included in their space of fast points is precisely the set
of polynomial functions over F2 in n−k variables x1, . . . , xn−k and of degree d. (Note
this set is empty if d > n − k.) The cardinality of this set is therefore 2
(
n − k
d
)
− 1.
(ii) The set of polynomial functions over F2 in n variables x1, . . . , xn and of degree d
which have their space of fast points equal to 〈en−k+1, . . . , en〉 is equal to the set
F(n − k, d, 0) (when considered as functions in n variables).
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Proof The proof of (i) follows from Proposition 4.
For (ii) we prove first the “⊆” part. Assume f has the space of fast points equal to
〈en−k+1, . . . , en〉. By (i), f is a function in x1, . . . , xn−k . Moreover, we show that f ∈
F(n − k, d, 0), i.e. f has no fast point when considered as a function in x1, . . . , xn−k .
Assume, for a contradiction, that f has such a non-trivial fast point a = (a1, . . . , an−k) 
= 0.
But then the n-tuple (a1, . . . , an−k, 0, . . . , 0) is also a non-trivial fast point of f as function
over x1, . . . , xn. However, this fast point is not in the space 〈en−k+1, . . . , en〉. Contradiction.
For the reverse inclusion, “⊇”, let f ∈ F(n−k, d, 0). As a function in x1, . . . , xn, f has
a space of fast points that contains 〈en−k+1, . . . , en〉, by (i). We show that f has no other
fast points. Assume a = (a1, . . . , an) 
= 0 is a fast point, and denote by b = (a1, . . . , an−k).
Since f does not depend on xn−k+1, . . . , xn, we have af = bf , so b is a fast point
of f as a function in n − k variables. Since f ∈ F(n − k, d, 0), this means b = 0, so
a ∈ 〈en−k+1, . . . , en〉.
The key to computing |F(n, d, k)| will be by doing a convenient change of variables.
Theorem 4 Let f : Kn → K be a polynomial function. The space of fast points of f has
basis a1, . . . , ak iff the space of fast points of g has basis en−k+1, . . . , en, where g(y) =
f (T y) and T is any invertible matrix having the last k columns equal to a1, . . . , ak .
Proof Using Theorem 3, we know that a1, . . . , ak are all fast points for f iff en−k+1, . . . , en
are all fast points for g. Moreover any point a is a fast point for f iff T −1a is a fast
point for g. On the other hand, simple linear algebra yields a ∈ 〈a1, . . . , ak〉 iff T −1a ∈
〈T −1a1, . . . , T −1ak〉 = 〈en−k+1, . . . , en〉.
We can now use Theorem 4 to generalise Lemma 1 to an arbitrary space of fast points:
Lemma 2 Let V be a vector subspace of Fn2 of dimension k. Let T be any n × n invertible
matrix whose last k columns are a basis for V .
(i) The set of polynomial functions over F2 in n variables of degree d which have V
included in their space of fast points equals the set of polynomial functions of the form
g(T −1x) where g ranges over all polynomial functions over F2 in n − k variables
x1, . . . , xn−k and of degree d. This set has cardinality 2
(
n − k
d
)
− 1 for 0 ≤ d ≤ n − k
and is empty otherwise.
(ii) The set of polynomial functions over F2 in n variables of degree d which have their
set of fast points equal to V equals
{g(T −1x)|g ∈ F(n − k, d, 0)}
Proof Use Lemma 1 and Theorem 4.
Lemma 2(i) above also gives an alternative proof of the following result:
Proposition 5 [4, Theorem 3.1] The space of fast points of a polynomial function f over
F2 has dimension at most n − deg(f ).
Hence F(n, d, k) = ∅ for k > n − d. In equations (1) and (2), in the upper bound of the
summation we can replace n by n − d.
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The first major step in our counting problem will be to construct the set F(n, d, k) from
the set F(n − k, d, 0), thus reducing the computation of |F(n, d, k)| to the computation of
|F(n − k, d, 0)|:
Theorem 5
(i) We have
F(n, d, k) =
⋃
T
{g(T x)|g ∈ F(n − k, d, 0)}
with T ranging over all the invertible n × n matrices.
(ii) Denote by Vi , with i = 1, . . . ,
(
n
k
)
2
all the spaces of Fn2 of dimension k. For each
such vector space Vi consider an invertible n×n matrix Ti such that the last k columns
of Ti generate Vi . Then
F(n, d, k) =
(
n
d
)
2⋃
i=1
{g
(
T −1i x
)
|g ∈ F(n − k, d, 0)}
and the sets in the union above are disjoint.
(iii) We have
|F(n, d, k)| =
(
n
k
)
2
|F(n − k, d, 0)|.
Proof
(i) Let g ∈ F(n− k, d, 0). By Lemma 1(ii), g, when viewed as a function in n variables,
has a space of fast points of dimension k. By Theorem 4, g(T x) also has a space of
fast points of dimension k, so it is in F(n, d, k). The reverse follows from (ii).
(ii) We can partition F(n, d, k) into the following disjoint sets:
F(n, d, k) =
⋃
Vi
{f | deg(f ) = d, the space of fast points of f is Vi}.
Using Lemma 2(ii), we have that
{f | deg(f ) = d, the space of fast points of f is Vi}={g
(
T −1i x
)
|g∈F(n−k, d,0)}.
(iii) follows from (ii) immediately.
Using the Theorem above and equation (2) we obtain:
|F(n, d)| =
n−d∑
k=1
(
n
k
)
2
|F(n − k, d, 0)|
Using equation (3) this can be rewritten to obtain a linear recurrence relation on n for
|F(n, d)|:
|F(n, d)| =
n−d∑
k=1
(
n
k
)
2
(
2
(
n − k
d
)
− 1 − |F(n − k, d)|
)
(4)
Using the initial conditions |F(d, d)| = 0 (there is only one term of degree d in d
variables, and it has no non-trivial fast points) we can already compute recursively any
|F(n, d)| (and then any |F(n, d, k)|).
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For a few particular cases we can immediately obtain an explicit formula:
Proposition 6
(i) |F(n, d, n − d)| =
(
n
d
)
2
.
(ii) |F(n, d, n − d − 1)| = 0.
(iii) For degree d = 1 we have |F(n, 1)| = |F(n, 1, n−1)| = 2n −1 and |F(n, 1, k)| = 0
for all 0 ≤ k < n− 1. In other words, all functions of degree one have a space of fast
points of dimension n − 1.
(iv) For degree d = n − 1 we have |F(n, n − 1)| = |F(n, n − 1, 1)| = 2n − 1, and
|F(n, n − 1, 0)| = 0. In other words all functions of degree n − 1 have exactly one
non-trivial fast point.
(v) For degree d = n−2 we have |F(n, n−2)| = |F(n, n−2, 2)| = (2n−1)(2n−1−1)/3.
This implies that if a function of degree n − 2 has non-trivial fast points, then it has
exactly 3 such points (to form, together with 0, a space of dimension 2).
Proof First note that, as mentioned above there is only one term of degree n, and it has no
non-trivial fast points, hence |F(n, n, 0)| = 1 for all n. For (i), using Theorem 5 we have:
|F(n, d, n − d)| =
(
n
n − d
)
2
|F(d, d, 0)| =
(
n
n − d
)
2
=
(
n
d
)
2
Using (i) and equation (1) we prove (ii), first for d = n − 1 and then for arbitrary d:
|F(n, n − 1, 0)| = 2
(
n
n − 1
)
− 1 − |F(n, n − 1, 1)| = 2n − 1 −
(
n
n − 1
)
2
= 0
|F(n, d, n − d − 1)| =
(
n
k
)
2
|F(d + 1, d, 0)| = 0
Using (i) and (ii) and equation (1) we can then easily obtain (iii)-(v).
In Duan et al., a formula for |F(n, d)| was only obtained for the cases of degree d = n−1
and d = n − 2, see [4, Theorem 3.3, Theorem 3.6]. Proposition 6 (iv) and (v) above gives
alternative proofs of their results.
For the rest of the cases in [4], some experimental results were computed by enumerating
each single polynomial function and checking whether it has a fast point. This exhaustive
approach has a very high computational cost (higher than exponential in n) and therefore
already for n = 7 some entries were left blank in their tables (namely n = 7, k = 3, 4 and
n = 8, k = 3, 4, 5). We can fill in these missing values at a very modest computational cost
(the complexity is polynomial in n), using the recurrence (4). Our data for values of n up to
8 is presented in Section 7.
In addition to the recurrence relation (4), we also obtained an explicit formula for
|F(n, d)|:
Theorem 6
|F(n, d)| =
n−d∑
i=1
(−1)i−1 2 i(i−1)2
(
n
i
)
2
(
2
(
n − i
d
)
− 1
)
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Proof For any vector subspace V ⊆ Fn2, denote by AV the set of functions in n variables,
of degree d, which have V included in their space of fast points. We have
F(n, d) =
⋃
a∈Fn2\{0}
A〈a〉.
To compute |F(n, d)| we employ an inclusion-exclusion formula and the fact that AV1 ∩
AV2 = A〈V1∪V2〉:
|F(n, d)| =
∑
a1∈Fn2\{0}
|A〈a1〉| −
∑
a1,a2
|A〈a1,a2〉| +
∑
a1,a2,a3
|A〈a1,a2,a3〉| − . . .
Obviously, the sets above are not all distinct. Namely for each vector space V , |AV |
appears in the formula above a number of times equal to the number of spanning sets of
V . More precisely, |AV | is added once for each spanning set of V of odd cardinality and
subtracted once for each spanning set of V of even cardinality. So overall |AV | is counted
a number of times equal to the number of odd cardinality spanning sets of V minus the
number of even cardinality spanning sets of V . By the technical Lemma 3 in the Appendix,
this number is equal to
(−1)i−12 i(i−1)2 .
where i = dim(V ). By Lemma 2(i), |AV | = 2
(
n − i
d
)
− 1. The maximum dimension of
the space of fast points of a function in F(n, d) is n − d. For each dimension i between
1 and n − d there are (n
i
)
2 subspaces V of dimension i. Putting everything together in the
inclusion-exclusion formula above we obtain
|F(n, d)| =
n−d∑
i=1
(−1)i−12 i(i−1)2
(
n
i
)
2
(
2
(
n − i
d
)
− 1
)
.
Using Theorems 5 (iii) and 6 and equation (3) we can now obtain explicit formulae for
all |F(n, d, k)|:
Corollary 3
|F(n, d, k)| =
(
n
k
)
2
n−k−d∑
i=0
(−1)i 2 i(i−1)2
(
n − k
i
)
2
(
2
(
n − k − i
d
)
− 1
)
Remark 2 It might be possible to prove Theorem 6 by using some method of solving the
recurrence (4), or by induction, using again the recurrence (4). We did not find any simple
proof along those lines, so we preferred the current proof that uses a natural inclusion-
exclusion argument.
6 Higher order differentiation and change of variables
In this section we give some results regarding the use of change of variables with higher
order differentiation.
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6.1 Background
We recall in this subsection a few known or straightforward results. An explicit formula for
higher order derivatives can be obtained easily by induction:
Proposition 7 Let f : Kn → K be a function in n variables x1, . . . , xn. Let a1, . . . , ak ∈
Kn not necessarily distinct. Then
(k)a1,...,ak f (x) =
∑
u=(u1,...,uk)∈{0,1}k
(−1)k−w(u)f (x + u1a1 + · · · + ukak)
where w() denotes the Hamming weight.
When K is the binary field F2, in the last formula above the summation is over the
elements of the vector space generated by a1, . . . , ak . We have therefore:
Corollary 4 Let f : Fn2 → F2 be a function in n variables x1, . . . , xn. Let a1, . . . , ak ∈ Fn2
be linearly independent and let V be the vector space generated by a1, . . . , ak . Then
(k)a1,...,ak f (x) =
∑
v∈V
f (x + v).
Corollary 5 Let a1, . . . , ak ∈ Fn2 and b1, . . . , bk ∈ Fn2 be two sets of linearly independent
vectors. We have:

(k)
a1,...,ak = (k)b1,...,bk
iff
a1, . . . , ak and b1, . . . , bk generate the same vector space.
Depending on the values of the a1, . . . , ak and the characteristic of the field, 
(k)
a1,...,ak f
could collapse, becoming the identical zero function regardless of the function f . This hap-
pens, for example, if the characteristic is 2 and a1, . . . , ak are not linearly independent.
Hence in F2 we will always assume that a1, . . . , ak are linearly independent.
6.2 Higher order differentiation and generalisation of fast points
Theorem 2 can be generalised as follows:
Theorem 7 Let a1, . . . , ak ∈ Fn2 be linearly independent. Let T be an invertible n × n
matrix over K . Let f be a function of n variables f : Kn → K; denote by g the function
obtained from f via the change of variables defined by T , namely: g(y) = f (T y). Then we
have: (
(k)a1,...,ak f
)
(T y) =
(

(k)
T −1a1,...,T −1ak
g
)
(y).
In particular if there exist k columns of T , say columns i1, . . . , ik which equal a1, . . . , ak
(in the case of K = F2, it suffices that there exist k columns of T that generate the vector
space 〈a1, . . . , ak〉) then we have:
(
(k)a1,...,ak f
)
(T y) =
(
(k)ei1 ,...,eik
g
)
(y).
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Proof This Theorem can be proven by repeated application of Theorem 2, or directly by
applying the change of variables x = T y in the formula given in Proposition 7:
(
(k)a1,...,ak f
)
(T y =
∑
u∈{0,1}k
f (T y + u1a1 + · · · + ukak)
=
∑
u∈{0,1}k
f (T (y + u1T −1a1 + · · · + ukT −1ak))
=
∑
u∈{0,1}k
g(y + u1T −1a1 + · · · + ukT −1ak)
=
(

(k)
T −1a1,...,T −1ak
g
)
(y).
An equivalent formulation of the Theorem above is to say that the following diagram
commutes:
F(Kn,K) 
(k)
a1,...,ak−→ F(Kn,K)
T ↓ ↓ T
F(Kn,K)

(k)
ei1
,...,eik−→ F(Kn,K)
with the notations defined after Theorem 2.
We introduce a generalisation of the notion of fast point, called a fast space (not to be
confused with the space of fast points).
Definition 5 Let f : Fn2 → F2. A vector subspace V ⊆ Fn2 is called a fast space for f if
there is a basis a1, . . . , ak of V such that deg
(

(k)
a1,...,ak f
)
< deg(f ) − k.
Note that Corollary 5 ensures that if one basis of V satisfies the condition in the definition
above, then all the bases do.
It is easy to see that if a vector space V contains a fast point, then it is a fast space.
However the reverse is not always true: a vector space V can be a fast space but not contain
any fast points. The following example illustrates this situation:
Example 2 Let f (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) = x1x3x4 + x2x3x5 + x1x2. The space V = 〈e1, e2〉
is a fast space, as (2)e1,e2f = 1 has degree 0 < deg(f ) − 2 = 1. However one can check
that none of the elements of V , namely e1, e2 and e1 + e2 is a fast point as differentiating
with respect to any of them produces a polynomial of degree two: e1f = x3x4 + x2,
e2f = x3x5 + x1, e1+e2f = x3x4 + x3x5 + x1 + x2 + 1.
We can extend Proposition 4 to higher order derivatives:
Proposition 8 Let f : Fn2 → F2 be a polynomial function and i1, . . . , ik be distinct indices
in {1, . . . , n}. The total degree of (k)ei1 ,...,eik f equals di1,...,ik −k where di1,...,ik is the highest
total degree among the monomials of f that are divisible by the term xi1 . . . xik .
In particular, 〈ei1 , . . . , eik 〉 is a fast space for f iff none of the terms of highest degree in
f are divisible by the term xi1 . . . xik .
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Proof Denote t = xi1 . . . xik and factor out the term t , writing f = tf1 + f2 with f1 not
depending on any of the variables xi1 , . . . , xik and none of the terms of f2 divisible by t .
Using [2, Theorem 1] and [3, Section IV B] or [5, Section 4.1] we have that (k)ei1 ,...,eik f =
f1.
Using this result and Theorem 7 we can give a characterisation of fast spaces:
Theorem 8 Let f : Fn2 → F2 be a polynomial function and a1, . . . , ak ∈ Fn2 linearly
independent. Let T be an invertible matrix constructed as follows: the last k columns are
a1, . . . , ak and the remaining n−k columns are any vectors so that T is invertible. Consider
the change of variables x = T y.
The total degree of (k)a1,...,ak f is deg(f ) − k − k′ iff in f (T y) the highest total degree
among the monomials divisible by the term yn−k+1 · · · yn is deg(f ) − k′.
In particular, 〈a1, . . . , ak〉 is a fast space for f iff none of the terms of highest degree in
f (T y) are divisible by the term yn−k+1 · · · yn.
One could also attempt to count functions that admit fast spaces, but the analysis becomes
quite difficult and will be left as a topic of possible future work.
7 Numerical results
Using the recurrence relation (4), or alternatively the explicit formulae given in Theorem 6
and Corollary 3, we computed numerical values for polynomials with fast points in up to 8
variables and presented them in Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 (Tables 3–6 are in the Appendix)
with each individual table corresponding to a given number of variables. All the numbers
refer to equivalence classes, as explained at the beginning of Section 5.
For each number of variables n, the main part of each table displays |F(n, d, k)| (the
number of polynomial functions of degree d with a space of fast points of dimension k) in
row d, column k.
The last two columns in each table give in row d the value of |F(n, d)| (the number of
polynomial functions of degree d with non-trivial fast points) in absolute terms, and also as
a proportion of the total number
(
2
(
n
d
)
− 1
)
of polynomials of degree d. For n = 7 and
n = 8, the values of |F(n, d)| and of 2
(
n
d
)
− 1 are also plotted in Fig. 1 in the Appendix.
Since the former is much lower than the latter, we used a logarithmic (log2) scale.
Table 1 Number of functions with fast points in 7 variables
d\k 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 |F(7, d)| Ratio
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 127 127 1
2 0 1763776 0 330708 0 2667 2097151 1
3 34231364608 126046992 2314956 0 11811 128373759 0.00374
4 34355647824 4078732 0 11811 4090543 0.00012
5 2094484 0 2667 2667 0.00127
6 0 127 127 1
7 1 0 0
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Table 2 Number of functions with fast points in 8 variables
d\k 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |F(8, d)| Ratio
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 255 255 1
2 112881664 0 149920960 0 5622036 0 10795 155553791 0.57948
3 7.20489E+16 8.729E+12 10713994320 84330540 0 97155 8.7398E+12 0.00012
4 1.18059E+21 8.76069E+12 346692220 0 200787 8.76104E+12 7.42089E-09
5 7.20576E+16 534093420 0 97155 534190575 7.41338E-09
6 268424660 0 10795 10795 0.00004
7 0 255 255 1
8 1 0 0
The values of |F(n, d)| (in absolute terms, and also as a proportion of the total number
of polynomials of degree d) were given in [4, Table A.1] for n up to 8, except for degrees 3
and 4 in 7 variables and for degrees 3, 4, and 5 in 8 variables, which could not be computed
due to the very high computational complexity.
Our results confirm their existing results and also fill in the missing entries in their
table, all at negligible computational cost (less than 1 second for each n, even on a low
specification computer).
Looking at the tables we can notice some trends. For 3 ≤ d ≤ n − 2, the ratio is very
small, i.e. a very small proportion of functions have fast points. For each fixed degree d,
(again, with 3 ≤ d ≤ n−2), the number of functions decreases as k increases (excluding the
last two entries, k = n − d − 1 and k = n − d for which results are given in Proposition 6).
So most of the functions have no fast points, much fewer functions have one fast point, even
fewer functions have 3 fast points and so on. Asymptotic results will be obtained in the next
section.
8 Cryptographic consequences
Throughout this section we only work with functions over F2.
We are given a cryptographic function f as a “black box” function with n input bits and
one output bit. In order to cryptanalyse the function, we differentiate f several times. Note
that (k)a1,...,ak f is also a “black box”: its output can be evaluated for any given input, by
doing 2k calls to f (see Proposition 7). The attacks that use this approach hope to determine
some “non-random” properties of (k)a1,...,ak f .
The first consequence of our previous analysis (Theorem 7) is that instead of computing

(k)
a1,...,ak f we can first replace f by another “black box” function g, which simply feeds T x
into f , where T is any matrix whose first k columns are a1, . . . , ak (or any other k columns
that generate the same vector space). We then compute (k)e1,...,ek g. These two methods are
equivalent (in the sense that the degree of the resulting function is the same), but depending
on the particular application, there may be advantages of doing one or the other.
Having a low degree (preferably degree one) is a particularly useful property of

(k)
a1,...,ak f and this is the property exploited by the AIDA/cube attacks. Since evaluating
this function takes 2k calls to f , we hope that a low degree is reached for a relatively low k
(lower than deg(f ) − 1). It is therefore useful for an attacker if a1 is a fast point for f (and
a2 is a fast point for a1f etc.) So let us concentrate on one differentiation.
Assume that f is random, of degree d, in the sense that it is picked out of a uniform
distribution over the set of polynomials functions of degree d in n variables. Throughout the
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rest of this section we assume that 3 ≤ d ≤ n−3. For d = 1, n−2, n−1 see Proposition 6
or [4, Theorems 3.3 and 3.6] and for d = 2 see [4, Section 3.4].
We then pick a point a ∈ Fn2 \ {0} and compute the derivative of f w.r.t. a. We pick a
assuming a uniform distribution on Fn2 \ {0}, and independently from f .
The first question we can ask is: what is the probability of a being a fast point for f ?
Proposition 9 The probability of a being a fast point for f only depends on the degree d of
f and is given by
2
(
n − 1
d
)
− 1
2
(
n
d
)
− 1
≈ 1
2
(
n − 1
d − 1
)
Proof Apply Lemma 2 (i) for V = 〈a〉. Since dim(V ) = 1, there are 2(n−1d ) − 1 functions
that have the fast point a. For the approximation we have
2
(
n − 1
d
)
− 1
2
(
n
d
)
− 1
≈ 2
(
n − 1
d
)
2
(
n
d
) = 1
2
(
n
d
)
−
(
n − 1
d
) = 1
2
(
n − 1
d − 1
) .
Consequently the strongest functions (i.e. least likely to have fast points) are those of
degree close to half the number of variables. The probability of having a fast point is lowest
when the degree is close to half the number of variables, and increases as we move away
towards higher degrees; it also increases as we move from n/2 towards lower degrees. How-
ever in all cases the probability of a being a fast point is extremely small, and it tends to
zero as n goes to infinity.
The second question we may ask is, given a random f as above, what is the probability
that f has fast points? Again this only depends on the degree d of f , and is given by
|F(n, d)|
2
(
n
d
)
− 1
.
We will now estimate this quantity. These approximations are valid when d and n−k−d
are both greater than 2.
In the sum from Theorem 6:
|F(n, d)| =
n−d∑
i=1
(−1)i−1 2 i(i−1)2
(
n
i
)
2
(2
(
n − i
d
)
− 1)
we compare the absolute value of successive terms by estimating the ratio of term i + 1 and
term i:
2
i(i+1)
2
(
n
i + 1
)
2
(
2
(
n − i − 1
d
)
− 1
)
2
i(i−1)
2
(
n
i
)
2
(
2
(
n − i
d
)
− 1
) = 2i · 2
n−i − 1
2i+1 − 1 ·
(
2
(
n − i − 1
d
)
− 1
)
(
2
(
n − i
d
)
− 1
)
≈ 2
n−i−1
2
(
n − i
d
)
−
(
n − i − 1
d
) ≈ 1
2
(
n − i − 1
d − 1
)
−n+i+1
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Hence the summands decrease rapidly in absolute value as i increases, and since they
have alternating signs we can approximate the sum by the first term (which also gives an
upper bound):
|F(n, d)| ≈
(
n
1
)
2
(2
(
n − 1
d
)
− 1) ≈ 2n+
(
n − 1
d
)
.
Hence
|F(n, d)|
2
(
n
d
)
− 1
≈ 2
n+
(
n − 1
d
)
2
(
n
d
) = 1
2
(
n − 1
d − 1
)
−n
.
Therefore this ratio tends to zero as n goes to infinity as long as d stays in the specified
range (3 ≤ d ≤ n − 3). More precisely, for any sequence (dn)n∈N with 3 ≤ dn ≤ n − 3 we
have
lim
n→∞
|F(n, dn)|
2(
n
dn
) − 1
= 0.
The decrease is very rapid, so the ratio is already very small for all n that are of interest
in cryptographical applications. In [4, Remark 12] it is conjectured that this ratio decreases
like a geometric series in n. We see here that in fact the decrease is much more rapid than
that.
We can also see how the ratio of the logarithms behaves:
log2(|F(n, d)|)
log2(2
(nd) − 1) ≈
(
n − 1
d
)
(
n
d
) = n − d
n
For example, if d = n/2, the above result tells us that the number of functions with fast
points is roughly the square root of the total number of functions.
However, the fact that f has a fast point does not mean it is easy to find that fast point.
For a given “black box” function f , the larger its space of fast points, the better the chances
of an arbitrarily chosen point to be a fast point. So we can refine the previous question as:
what is the probability that f has “a lot” of fast points? What is the probability that f has
“very few” fast points?
These probabilities are:
|F(n, d, k)|
2
(
n
d
)
− 1
with k close to n − d for “lots” of fast points, and k small for “very few” fast points.
Using the the same arguments as above, for 3 ≤ d ≤ n − k − 3 we can approximate
|F(n, d, k)| by the first term in the sum in Corollary 3, i.e.
|F(n, d, k)| ≈
(
n
k
)
2
(
2
(
n − k
d
)
− 1
)
≈ 2k(n−k)+
(
n − k
d
)
We have:
|F(n, d, k + 1)|
|F(n, d, k)| ≈
1
2
(
n − k − 1
d − 1
)
−n+2k+1
hence
|F(n, d, k)|  |F(n, d, k + 1)|
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for every k. This means that lots of functions have no fast points, much fewer have 1 fast
point, even fewer have 3 fast points etc.
Approximating the Gaussian binomial coefficients as follows:
(
n
k
)
2
=
∏n
i=n−k+1(2i − 1)∏k
i=1(2i − 1)
≈
∏n
i=n−k+1 2i∏k
i=1 2i
= 2k(n−k)
we have:
log2(|F(n, d, k + 1)|)
log2(|F(n, d, k)|)
≈
(
n − k − 1
d
)
(
n − k
d
) = n − k − d
n
.
Finally, let us also look at our results from the point of view of the designer of a cryp-
tographic function, rather than the attacker. We should avoid, as much as possible, that our
function has fast points. In light of our characterisation in Corollary 2, this means that we
should avoid functions in which some of the variables do not appear in any of the terms
of maximum total degree. Moreover, we should avoid functions that superficially look like
they depend on all the variables, but with a suitable change of variables, this is no longer
the case (see Example 1).
9 Conclusion
Using linear changes of variable we obtained an alternative characterisation of the “fast
points” introduced by Duan and Lai in [3]. We also completed the counting of functions
with fast points commenced by Duan et al. in [4], giving explicit formulae in the general
case. We discussed the cryptographic significance of our results. Fast points have very low
probability to be found if the function and the candidate fast point are chosen uniformly at
random and independently of each other. An attacker needs therefore to try to exploit extra
knowledge about the function in order to increase their chances of finding fast points.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Inter-
national License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source,
provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix
Lemma 3 Let V ⊆ Fnp be a vector space of dimension k. Let S0(k) denote the set of
spanning sets of V with even cardinality (we do not allow 0 to be an element of a spanning
set). Similarly S1(k) for odd cardinality. Then
|S1(k)| − |S0(k)| = (−1)k−1p k(k−1)2
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Table 3 Number of functions
with fast points in 3 variables d\k 0 1 2 |F(3, d)| Ratio
1 0 0 7 7 1
2 0 7 7 1
3 1 0 1
Table 4 Number of functions
with fast points in 4 variables d\k 0 1 2 3 |F(4, d)| Ratio
1 0 0 0 15 15 1
2 28 0 35 35 0.55556
3 0 15 15 1
4 1 0 0
Table 5 Number of functions with fast points in 5 variables
d\k 0 1 2 3 4 |F(5, d)| Ratio
1 0 0 0 0 31 31 1
2 0 868 0 155 1023 1
3 868 0 155 155 0.15152
4 0 31 31 1
5 1 0 0
Table 6 Number of functions with fast points in 6 variables
d\k 0 1 2 3 4 5 |F(6, d)| Ratio
1 0 0 0 0 0 63 63 1
2 13,888 0 18,228 0 651 18,879 0.57616
3 992,496 54,684 0 1,395 56,079 0.05348
4 32,116 0 651 651 0.01987
5 0 63 63 1
6 1 0 0
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Fig. 1 Number of polynomials
with fast points in 7 and 8
variables
Proof Firstly, since V is isomorphic to Fkp, the quantities |S1(k)| and |S0(k)| only depend
on k and do not depend on V .
Pick an arbitrary a ∈ V \ {0}. Obviously some spanning sets of V will contain a, some
will not. We pair each spanning set S that does not contain a with S ∪ {a}, which is also
a spanning set. Each spanning set appears in at most one such pair. In each pair one of
spanning sets is in S0(k) and other is in S1(k), so their effect cancels out in |S1(k)|−|S0(k)|.
The spanning sets that do not belong to any pair are precisely the spanning sets S that
contain a but S \ {a} is no longer a spanning set for V . Hence S \ {a} spans a vector space
of dimension k − 1. There are exactly pk−1 subspaces of V of dimension k − 1 that do
not contain a. Each of these spaces has |S0(k − 1)| spanning sets of even cardinality and
|S1(k −1)| spanning sets of odd cardinality. Obviously if S has even cardinality then S \ {a}
has odd cardinality and the other way around. Summarising, we have
|S1(k)| − |S0(k)| = pk−1(|S0(k − 1)| − |S1(k − 1)|) = −pk−1(|S1(k − 1)| − |S0(k − 1)|).
This recurrence relation together with the initial value |S1(1)| − |S0(1)| = 1 yields the
desired result.
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